It\u27s All Mine - Or at Least Part of It Is: A California Look at Property Apportionment Between the Families of an Interstate and an Intestate\u27s Predeceased Spouse by Popovich, Robert G.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 3 Article 11
4-15-1989
It's All Mine - Or at Least Part of It Is: A California
Look at Property Apportionment Between the
Families of an Interstate and an Intestate's
Predeceased Spouse
Robert G. Popovich
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Contracts Commons, Courts Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons, Family Law
Commons, Law and Society Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Remedies
Commons
This California Practicum is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert G. Popovich It's All Mine - Or at Least Part of It Is: A California Look at Property Apportionment Between the Families of an
Interstate and an Intestate's Predeceased Spouse, 16 Pepp. L. Rev. 3 (1989)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol16/iss3/11
It's All Mine-Or at Least Part of It Is: A
California Look at Property Apportionment
Between the Families of an Intestate and an
Intestate's Predeceased Spouse
I. INTRODUCTION
To the layperson, the term "intestate succession" probably brings
to mind the situation of a person dying without a will and the state
making the determination of who gets what share of the decedent's
property. When pressed further as to how the state would distribute
the decedent's property, the layperson might answer, quite logically,
that the order of distribution would try to mimic how most people
would want their estate distributed: the immediate family, consisting
of spouse and children, being first in line with the decedent's parents
next, then perhaps the decedent's siblings, and so on through the
family chain with the closest relatives having priority.
The practitioner, in most states, would be in general agreement
with such an interpretation with the added knowledge that an estate
may be subject to state intestate succession schemes even where a
will exists., When faced with a scenario where the decedent's spouse
had died some years earlier leaving everything to the decedent in a
valid will and the decedent having died intestate leaving no surviving
issue2 or new spouse, the logical response as to distribution of the es-
tate would probably be that the decedent's closest living relatives
should inherit. This, indeed, would generally be the appropriate re-
sponse for all jurisdictions in the United States with the exception of
California.
California is unique; it is the only state to have an intestate succes-
sion scheme in which a significant portion of the decedent's estate
may pass to the decedent's former in-laws3 rather than the dece-
1. Situations where an intestate succession scheme may be operative despite the
presence of a will include lapsed gifts, invalid components of a will, or "any part of the
estate ... not effectively disposed of by will." CAL. PROB. CODE § 6400 (West Supp.
1989). See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
2. "'Issue' of a person means all his or her lineal descendants of all generations,
with the relationship of parent and child at each generation being determined by the
definitions of child and parent." CAL. PROB. CODE § 50 (West Supp. 1989).
3. The term "former in-laws" [hereinafter in-laws] is used by the author to de-
dent's own blood relatives.4 In the scenario above, it may very well
be that, in California, the decedent's mother-in-law, brother-in-law,
or even great-grandnephew-in-law could inherit a sizeable portion of
the decedent's estate to the exclusion of the decedent's own mother,
father, brother, sister or other blood relative.
The blame for this seemingly anomalous result in California lies
with section 6402.5 of the Probate Code,5 the most recent in a long
line of so-called "in-law inheritance" statutes.6 Based on the feudal
doctrine of descent of ancestral property,7 California intestacy stat-
utes attempt to distribute an intestate's property based on its origin
or source of acquisition. It does this, in certain situations, by favoring
distribution to the family of a predeceased spouse, rather than the
decedent's family, with respect to property which came from or had
as its source a predeceased spouse.8
Determining exactly what property of the decedent is attributable
to a predeceased spouse can be difficult, and is often made more com-
plex as the intervening period between the death of the two spouses
increases. This difficulty can be further compounded when, during
this intervening period, any one or combination of the following oc-
cur: the value of the property changes; the surviving spouse makes
capital outlays or renders services with regard to the property; or the
property is transformed due to sale, exchange, condemnation or casu-
alty. Assuming the source of an underlying asset of the decedent's
estate can be traced to a predeceased spouse, the question indeed
arises as to what extent the relatives of such predeceased spouse par-
ticipate in any changes in the property's value after the death of the
first spouse.9
This practicum guides the practitioner through the quagmire of ap-
note not only those individuals such as father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law,
etc., but also to include the spouse's issue that are not issue of the subject marriage
(e.g., step-children).
4. Ohio was the only other state which modernly had similar extensive in-law in-
heritance provisions, but they were repealed effective January 1, 1976. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2105.10 (repealed 1976). Ohio continues with an in-law intestate provi-
sion but only as a last resort to prevent escheat to the state where the decedent dies
leaving no surviving kindred. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(I) (Baldwin 1986). See
also infra note 56 relating to similar California anti-escheat provisions.
5. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5 (West Supp. 1989). Provisions are applicable only to
decedents dying on or after January 1, 1985.
6. See infra notes 21-39 and accompanying text for a historical perspective of cur-
rent section 6402.5.
7. Reppy & Wright, California Probate Code § 229: Making Sense of a Badly
Drqfted Provision for Inheritance By a Community Property Decedent's Former In-
laws, 8 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 107, 108 (1981).
8. See infra notes 60, 68-69, 77-91 and accompanying text.
9. For example, assume property from a predeceased spouse had a value of
$50,000 when the first spouse died. Subsequently, the surviving spouse renders serv-
ices with regard to the property and makes capital contributions. At the death of the
surviving spouse, the property has increased in value to $500,000. The question then
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portioning property between the families of the intestate and the in-
testate's predeceased spouse under the California in-law inheritance
provisions. First, the practicum provides the operational framework
of the California statutory in-law inheritance provisions, including a
brief look at historical developments. Next, it addresses the circum-
stances under which a decedent's property is considered to have had
its source from a predeceased spouse. Included therein, is a discus-
sion of how property apportionment problems can arise within the
in-law inheritance context, with a special emphasis on apportionment
problems that develop as a result of changes in property values dur-
ing the intervening period between the death of the two spouses. Fi-
nally, this practicum examines the solutions to these apportionment
problems.
II. OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA'S IN-LAW INTESTATE SUCCESSION
SCHEME
"Through a series of poorly drafted statutes, California has devel-
oped an almost incomprehensible rule for intestate succession if a
widow or widower dies without either children or a new spouse."i0
After such a foreboding statement, any understanding of and applica-
tion of in-law inheritance provisions may appear insurmountable. In
reality, however, the provisions, at least on their surface, can be
deciphered.
The California in-law inheritance provisions are contained in sec-
tion 6402.5 of the Probate Code," which is within the intestate suc-
cession provisions of the code.' 2 To oversimplify, assume that a
wife's husband (H,)13 predeceased her (WI) within a certain number
of years and she subsequently died intestate without a new spouse or
surviving issue. Property which the wife had previously acquiredi4
becomes: how much of the $450,000 increase in the property's value is subject to possi-
ble inheritance by the decedent's in-laws?
10. Estate of McInnis v. Sylvester, 182 Cal. App. 3d 949, 956, 227 Cal. Rptr. 604, 609
(1986) (quoting Bruch, The Definition and Division of Marital Property in California:
Towards Parity and Simplicity, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 868-69 (1982)).
11. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5 (West Supp. 1989).
12. Id.
13. To make this practicum more readable, the adoption of a few typographical
conventions and some assumptions is necessary. Throughout the text, H1 and W, will
be used to denote husband and wife, respectively,-and unless otherwise stated, it is as-
sumed that H, predeceased W1 . Additionally, where this convention is used, and unless
otherwise stated, it is assumed that W, subsequently dies intestate, without having re-
married, and is not survived by any children or issue thereof.
14. "Property" includes the predeceased spouse's share of separate property (CAL.
from her husband is inherited by the husband's blood relatives,
rather than the wife's own blood relatives. 15
The California in-law inheritance provisions have long been the fo-
cus of dissension among both courts and commentators alike.16 At
the center of their protests is the state's continued adherence to feu-
dal principals of ancestral property rights,17 which, in their applica-
tion to intestate succession, serve "to turn the property back to the
family from which it came."' 8 In addition to sometimes producing
anomalous and unfair intestacy distributions,' 9 the ancestrally in-
spired in-law inheritance provisions create what is often the logistic
nightmare of trying to determine from where or what source the de-
cedent's property was derived.20
A. Historical Perspective of California's In-Law Inheritance
Provisions
1. Phase One: The Beginning of In-law Inheritance
California's experiment with in-law inheritance began, innocently
enough, in 1880 with the introduction of subdivision 9 of section 1386
of the Civil Code.21 The scope of this early intestate succession legis-
PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f)(4) (West Supp. 1989)) and the predeceased spouse's share of
community property (id. § 6402.5(f)(1)-(3)). This includes property acquired by gift,
devise, inheritance, bequest, or by virtue of survival, from the predeceased spouse. Id.
§ 6402.5(f)(1)-(4).
15. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402 (West Supp 1989); id. § 6402.5 (West Supp. 1989).
16. See, e.g., Ferrier, Rules of Descent Under Probate Code Sections 228 and 229,
and Proposed Amendments, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 261, 280 (1937).
It should be considered, however, whether the complete elimination of these
code sections [in-law inheritance] from our rules of descent might not be pref-
erable .... They seem to represent an extreme application of the old common
law rule as to the descent of ancestral property which is being looked upon
with increasing disfavor in the states where it still exists.
Id.; Reppy & Wright, supra note 7, at 135. "Ancestral property inheritance should be
abolished in California." Id.; Ferrier, Gifts to "Heirs" in California, 26 CALIF. L. REV.
413, 431 (1938). "In addition to being responsible for numerous anomalies and injus-
tices in the law of intestate succession, [the in-law inheritance provisions] represent an
extreme and complex application of the old doctrine of descent of ancestral property,
which is a waning one." Id.
17. See generally T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 39, 71-81 (2d ed. 1953); Reppy &
Wright, supra note 7, at 108-09.
18. In re Estate of Putnam, 219 Cal. 608, 611, 28 P.2d 27, 27-28 (1933).
19. See Estate of McInnis v. Sylvester, 182 Cal. App. 3d 949, 227 Cal. Rptr. 604
(1986) (distribution not to decedent's nieces, with whom decedent had a very close re-
lationship, but to decedent's sister-in-law, whom decedent's predeceased husband had
been alienated from and had not spoken to or seen in over 28 years).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 92-98.
21. 1880 Cal. Stats. ch. CXV, § 1, at 14 (enacting subsection 9 of Civil Code § 1386).
Subsection 9 read as follows:
If the decedent be a widow or widower, and leave no kindred, and the estate,
or any portion thereof, was common property of such decedent, and his or her
deceased spouse, while such spouse was living, such common property shall go
to the father of such deceased spouse, or if he be dead, to the mother. If there
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lation, however, was quite limited when compared to its most recent
progeny. Specifically, it operated solely as an "anti-escheat" provi-
sion: inheritance by a limited group of the decedent's in-laws, only af-
ter no surviving kindred of the decedent could be found and only as a
last resort to prevent distribution of the decedent's property to the
state.2 2 The application of this early in-law inheritance provision was
also limited in that it only reached property which was originally
community property in the hands of both spouses.23
At this early stage in the development of the in-law inheritance
provisions, there was no need for kindred of the intestate W, (the
second spouse to die) to be concerned about determining the source
of the estate assets. As long as there were living kindred of the intes-
tate W, no part of Wj's estate would pass to relatives of her prede-
ceased husband H 1.
2. Phase Two: Broadening the Scope of In-law Inheritance
Twenty-five years later, in 1905, this early and relatively innocuous
anti-escheat in-law inheritance provision received a heavy dose of an-
cestral property theory which dramatically altered its posture within
the intestate succession scheme.24 The least controversial aspect of
these revisions was the broadened concept of property to now include
certain separate property of the predeceased spouse which had previ-
ously been given to the surviving spouse.25 The truly significant
change, however, was the repositioning of the point along the intes-
be no father nor mother, then such property shall go to the brother and sister
of such deceased spouse, in equal shares, and to the lawful issue of any de-
ceased brother or sister of such deceased spouse, by right of representation.
Id,
22. Id. Note that the group of possible takers did not include the predeceased
spouse's children or issue.
23. Id. The statute uses the term "common property," the forerunner term to
community property. The statute was not applicable to separate property of the dece-
dent that was derived from the predeceased spouse.
24. 1905 Cal. Stats. ch. CDXLIX, § 2, at 608. Subsection 8 of the revised Civil Code
section 1386 read as follows:
If the decedent is a widow or widower, and leaves no issue, and the estate or
any portion thereof was common property of such decedent and his or her de-
ceased spouse, while such spouse was living, or was separate property of his or
her deceased spouse, while such spouse was living, such property goes to the
children of such deceased spouse and the descendants thereof, and if none,
then to the father of such deceased spouse, or if he is dead, to the mother. If
there is no father nor mother, then such property goes to the brothers and
sisters of such deceased spouse, in equal shares, and to the lawful issue of any
deceased brother or sister of such deceased spouse by right of representation.
ICE
25. Id.
tate succession chain at which the provisions became applicable.
Where the original in-law inheritance provisions of 1880 served only
as a last resort catch-net to prevent escheat to the state when there
were no surviving kindred of W1, the revised provisions became oper-
able much earlier on the intestate succession hierarchy. W1's in-laws,
instead of any surviving kindred of W1, were given preference as to
certain property in Wl's estate when W, died a widow with no surviv-
ing issue.26
Subsequent to these revisions, determination of the source of the
intestate's property took on a much more significant role. Wl's in-
laws would now have a far greater incentive to show that H, was the
source of W1's property, since such a determination could result in
the in-laws inheriting part of Wl's estate to the exclusion of Wl's own
kindred. Similarly, Wl's surviving kindred would now have an incen-
tive to compile. evidence that Hi was not the source of the intestate's
property to rebut such an assertion by the in-laws.
3. Phase Three: Refinement of the Provisions
The next changes to the in-law inheritance provisions came during
the 1930's. These consisted of renumbering the provisions as part of
the newly-established Probate Code,27 together with modification,
clarification, and refinement of the provisions partially in response to
the interpretations by California courts.28
4. Phase Four: The Current Provisions
The most recent revisions to the in-law inheritance provisions be-
gan in 1979 with an amendment to the statute which reinforced its
ancestral property roots.29 Previously, the determination that certain
assets of the decedent had their original source with the predeceased
spouse served as the cornerstone in applying the in-law inheritance
provisions.3 0 However, the 1979 amendments introduced the concept
of the "portion of the decedent's estate attributable to the decedent's
predeceased spouse."3 1 This, to a large degree, codified the parame-
ters for determining the property which would be considered as hav-
26. M
27. 1931 Cal. Stats. ch. 281, §§ 228, 229, at 597 (enacting the Probate Code). Re-
numbered sections 228 and 229 refer to the predeceased spouse's share of community
and separate property, respectively.
28. Reppy & Wright, supra note 7, at 116-20.
29. 1979 Cal. Stats. ch. 298, § 2.
30. See supra notes 8, 17-19 and acdompanying text.
31. 1979 Cal. Stats. ch. 298, § 2. The pertinent portion of revised Probate Code sec-
tion 228 read as follows: "If the decedent leaves no living spouse or issue and there are
issue of the decedent's predeceased spouse, the portion of the decedent's estate attribu-
table to the decedent's predeceased spouse shall go in equal shares ...... I& § 2(a)
(emphasis added).
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ing its source with the decedent's predeceased spouse-this property
being subject to possible in-law inheritance.3 2
In 1983, the in-law inheritance provisions were renumbered as sec-
tion 6402.5 of the Probate Code.33 The 1983 amendments also added
two important restrictions to the application of the in-law inheritance
provisions. First, only real property of the decedent attributable to
the decedent's predeceased spouse would be subject to possible in-law
inheritance.3 4 Second, only such real property attributable to a
spouse who predeceased the decedent by not more than fifteen years
would be subject to possible in-law inheritance. 35 Although these
changes did not alleviate the potential problem of apportioning prop-
erty attributable to the decedent's predeceased spouse, they did signal
a slight pullback in the scope of property which might be subject to
the in-law inheritance provisions.3 6 Previous in-law inheritance pro-
visions had not been limited by either of these two restrictions.37
Finally, in 1986, the in-law provisions were amended once again to
recant, in part, the 1983 statutory provision precluding personalty. 38
32. Discussion of the definition and application of the "portion attributed to the
decedent's predeceased spouse" is postponed. See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying
text. This codification of the source rules, however, does not offer any significant sim-
plification to the apportionment problems. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying
text.
33. 1983 Cal. Stats. ch. 842, § 55 (enacting section 6402.5 of the Probate Cede). Sec-
tion 6402.5 reads, in part, as follows:
For purposes of distributing real property under this section if the decedent
had a predeceased spouse who died not more than 15 years before the dece-
dent and there is no surviving spouse or issue of the decedent, the portion of
the decedent's estate attributable to the decedent's predeceased spouse passes
as follows:
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(a) (West Supp. 1989).
34. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(a) (West Supp. 1989).
35. Id
36. This effectively alleviated some necessity for property apportionment. If it
were known that H1 died more than 15 years before W,, there would be no possible
application of the in-law inheritance provisions, even if it were determined that all of
the decedent's property was attributable to the predeceased spouse.
37. The difficulty associated with tracing the source of personalty may have acted
as a practical limitation, although there was no such prior statutory limitation. The
adoption of a 15-year limitation with regard to real property, however, could be viewed
as a real restriction. Many cases under the prior law show evidence of tracing the
source of property to the decedent's predeceased spouse who had died more than 15
years before the decedent. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brady, 171 Cal. 1, 151 P. 275 (1915)
(15 years and 3 months); Estate of Bishop v. Donovan, 209 Cal. App. 2d 48, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 763 (1962) (30 years).
38. 1986 Cal. Stats. ch. 873, § 1 (amending section 6402.5 of the Probate Code to
current form). The current section is applicable to decedents who died on or after Jan-
uary 1, 1985 and reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
For purposes of distributing personal property under this section if the dece-
The decedent's personal property, attributable to a predeceased
spouse, is now subject to the in-law inheritance provisions provided
that such spouse had not predeceased the decedent by more than five
years.39
B. Operational Framework of the Current In-Law Inheritance
Provisions of California Probate Code Section 6402.5
The operation of in-law inheritance is part and parcel of the overall
statutory intestate succession scheme. With the exception of the in-
law inheritance provisions of section 6402.5, the California intestate
succession methodology is not unlike those found in many states.40
The intestate succession mechanism becomes operative with respect
to "[a]ny part of the estate of a decedent not effectively disposed of
by will .. ."41 The obvious situation where intestate succession pro-
visions apply is where the decedent dies without ever having made a
will.42 Similarly, the intestate succession provisions apply where
there is a will but it has been declared invalid in its entirety.43 The
intestate succession provisions may also be applicable to only a por-
tion of the decedent's estate. 44 Other situations where the provisions
apply include a will which is declared to be only partially invalid,45
lapsed gifts,46 and bequests and devises to a divorced spouse.47
All aspects of California intestate succession law, including the in-
dent had a predeceased spouse who died not more than five years before the
decedent, and there is no surviving spouse or issue of the decedent, the por-
tion of the decedent's estate attributable to the decedent's predeceased spouse
passes as follows:
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(b) (West Supp. 1989).
39. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(b) (West Supp. 1989). Real property remains at 15
years. Id. § 6402.5(a).
40. See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the general
operation of the intestate succession scheme.
41. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6400 (West Supp. 1989).
42. Id Reasons advanced for not having a will include: (1) procrastination; (2) su-
perstition that having a will hastens death; (3) belief that having no will avoids admin-
istration problems at death; (4) belief that having no will avoids delays in distribution
of estate; (5) belief that having no will avoids collection of debts against the estate; and
(6) lack of knowledge on how to make a will. BOWE & PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF
WILLS § 1.6 (rev. treatise 1986).
43. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6400 (West Supp. 1989). Examples of invalid wills in-
clude, but are not limited to, the following: persons not of legal age and/or not of
sound mind (CAL. PROB. CODE § 6100 (West Supp. 1989)); improperly executed will (i&i
§§ 6110-6113); disclaimed interests, (id. § 282); and where there is duress, menace,
fraud, or undue influence in procurement or execution (id. § 328.3).
44. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6400 (West Supp. 1989).
45. See supra note 43.
46. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6146, 6148 (West Supp. 1989) (failed devises become
part of residue, but where there is no residuary clause, they pass by intestate
succession).
47. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6122 (West Supp. 1989) (revocation of testamentary dis-
positions to former spouse).
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law inheritance provisions of section 6402.5, can be completely
avoided with a valid testamentary disposition.48
The basic preference of distribution under California's intestate
succession scheme is determined by sections 6401, 6402, and 6402.5 of
the Probate Code.4 9 If the decedent has a surviving spouse, the first
stop is section 6401 which specifies the portion of the decedent's es-
tate that passes to such spouse.50 Next section 6402, with the one ex-
ception of section 6402.5, determines the basic distribution of the
balance of the decedent's estate not passing to a surviving spouse. 51
Section 6402 establishes the hierarchy of who will inherit, with those
in a subordinate position taking only if there are no survivors in a su-
perior position. Quite logically, those most closely related to the de-
cedent have priority starting with the issue of the decedent,52
followed by the decedent's parents,53 the issue of the parents,54 the
grandparents of the decedent,55 and more remote next of kin.56
Section 6402.5 interrupts the basic intestate succession chain by in-
terjecting a separate intestacy scheme which gives preference to the
decedent's in-laws with respect to certain property of the decedent. 57
The section becomes operative only if all four basic components have
been satisfied: (1) there are no surviving potential takers up to a cer-
48. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6400 (West Supp. 1989). See Estate of Westerman v. West-
erman, 68 Cal. 2d 267, 437 P.2d 517, 66 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1968). "[The [in-law inheritance]
section never sought to limit the right of the surviving spouse to dispose of [property]
by will or conveyance." Id. at 272, 437 P.2d at 520, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 32 (quoting In re
Estate of Putnam, 219 Cal. 608, 611, 28 P.2d 27, 28 (1933)). See also Estate of Nereson v.
Nereson, 194 Cal. App. 3d 865, 239 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1987). "The rights of the in-law heirs
following the death of the first spouse are merely an expectancy, since the surviving
spouse is absolute owner and can dispose of the property in his lifetime or by will." Id
at 869, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
49. See also CAL. PROB. CODE § 6404 (West Supp. 1989) (final escheat provisions).
50. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401 (West Supp. 1989). The surviving spouse inherits the
decedent's one-half interest in both community and quasi-community property. CAL.
PROB. CODE § 6401(a), (b) (West Supp. 1989). The surviving spouse also inherits be-
tween 33% and 100% of the decedent's separate property depending on the existence
and number of surviving issue and parents. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401(c) (West Supp.
1989).
51. Id. § 6402.
52. Id, § 6402(a).
53. Id, § 6402(b).
54. IM § 6402(c).
55. Id. § 6402(d).
56. Id. § 6402(e), (f). See also id. § 6402(g). This is an in-law inheritance provision
(not the subject of this article), which acts solely as an anti-escheat provision similar to
the original in-law provisions of 1880. See generally supra note 22 and accompanying
text.
57. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402 (West Supp. 1989). The regular intestate succession
provisions apply "[e]xcept as provided in Section 6402.5 ...." Id,
tain point on the basic intestate succession hierarchy scheme;58 (2)
the decedent had a spouse who predeceased the decedent by not
more than a statutory number of years depending on the nature of
the decedent's property;5 9 (3) some part of the decedent's property is
considered attributable to such predeceased spouse;60 and (4) the rel-
atives of the predeceased spouse (the decedent's in-laws) are of a cer-
tain degree of kinship to the predeceased spouse.6 '
The first component of section 6402.5, certain potential takers not
surviving the decedent, signifies at what point along the intestate suc-
cession chain the in-law inheritance provisions become operable.
This point is where the decedent is not survived by either issue or
spouse.6 2 Although the decedent's issue or spouse have preference
over the decedent's in-laws, an in-law's potential inheritance interest
comes into effect very early along the intestate succession hierarchy,
having preference over any of the decedent's relatives other than is-
sue or surviving spouse.63
The second component of section 6402.5 requires that the decedent
had, at one time or another, been married and that the decedent's
spouse predeceased the decedent.64 This component of section 6402.5
also places certain limitations on the length of time between the
death of the decedent and the decedent's predeceased spouse. Here
the statute differentiates between the decedent's real and personal
property. With respect to disposing of the decedent's real property,
the decedent's spouse must have died "not more than 15 years before
the decedent ...."65 For purposes of the decedent's personal prop-
erty,6 6 the period is shortened to only five years.67
Therefore, if the decedent's spouse predeceased the decedent by
more than fifteen years, the decedent's in-laws would not be in a
58. Id, § 6402.5(a), (b).
59. IkL
60. Id.
61. Id, § 6402.5(a)(1-4), (b)(1-4).
62. Id, § 6402.5(a), (b). There are also two additional anti-escheat provisions
within this section. See id. § 6402.5(a)(5), (b)(5). These anti-escheat provisions are not
the subject of this article and future references to section 6402.5 and its requirements
are directed to primary in-law inheritance provisions and not these latter anti-escheat
aspects.
63. Numerically, section 6402.5 becomes operative between subsections (a) and (b)
of section 6402. Id § 6402.5(a), (a)(4), (b), (b)(4).
64; See id § 6402.5 (a), (b). Without having been married, there would be no in-
laws as potential takers. Additionally, if the spouse did not predecease the decedent,
the intestate succession provisions of section 6401 (dealing with the surviving spouse's
share of the decedent's estate) would govern. See supra note 50.
65. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(a) (West Supp. 1989).
66. For purposes of these provisions, personal property is defined as "that personal
property in which there is a written record of title or ownership and the value of
which in the aggregate is ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or more." Id § 6402.5(e).
67. Id § 6402.5(b).
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preferential position, under section 6402.5, to inherit either the dece-
dent's real or personal property. If the decedent's spouse prede-
ceased the decedent by more than five years but not more than
fifteen years, the in-laws may be in a preferential position to inherit
the decedent's real property, but not the decedent's personal prop-
erty. Finally, if the decedent's spouse predeceased the decedent by
not more than five years, the decedent's in-laws may be in a
favorable position to inherit the decedent's real and personal
property.
The third component of section 6402.5, the decedent's property at-
tributable to a predeceased spouse, represents the core of ancestral
property theory-the basis of the in-law inheritance provisions. 68
This component contains the source rules which determine what por-
tion of the decedent's estate, if any, is subject to possible in-law
inheritance.6 9
The fourth and final component of section 6402.5, a certain degree
of kinship of the decedent's in-laws, serves to both identify and place
a limit on those in-laws that have a preferential position of inheri-
tance over the decedent's own kindred. As indicated above, the in-
law provisions of section 6402.5 become operative at the point on the
intestate succession chain when there are no surviving spouse or is-
sue of the decedent but before other kindred of the decedent.70
If the in-law provisions become operative, the focus shifts from the
decedent's kindred to the kindred of the predeceased spouse (dece-
dent's in-laws), for which the statute provides a separate intestate
succession hierarchy.71 The predeceased spouse's issue (decedent's
step-children or issue thereof) are first in line 72 with the predeceased
spouse's parents next,73 followed by any issue of the predeceased
spouse's parents.7 4 However, once the point has been reached where
68. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
69. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f)(1)-(4)-(West Supp. 1989). Discussion of these stat-
utory source rules and related apportionment issues is postponed. See infra notes 77-
91 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
71. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(a)(1)-(3) (West, Supp. 1989) (decedent's real prop-
erty); id. § 6402.5(b)(1)-(3) (decedent's personal property).
72. Id, § 6402.5(a)(1) (decedent's real property); idi § 6402.5(b)(1) (decedent's per-
sonal property).
73. Id § 6402.5(a)(2) (decedent's real property); id, § 6402.5(b)(2) (decedent's per-
sonal property). This would be the decedent's mother/father-in-law.
74. 1& § 6402.5(a)(3) (decedent's real property); id, § 6402.5(b)(3) (decedent's per-
sonal property). This would include the decedent's brother/sister-in-law or issue
thereof.
there are no surviving issue of the decedent's mother-in-law or fa-
ther-in-law, the statute goes no further in giving preference to the
decedent's in-laws. At that point, the regular intestate succession
scheme of section 6402 becomes operative,75 with the decedent's kin-
dred once again becoming the preferred takers, beginning with the
decedent's parents and continuing to the more remote next of kin.76
III. DETERMINING WHAT PORTION OF THE DECEDENT'S PROPERTY IS
ATTRIBUTABLE TO A PREDECEASED SPOUSE
Regardless of whether all other requirements of section 6402.5 are
satisfied, no portion of a decedent's estate will be inherited by the de-
cedent's in-laws unless such portion of the estate is considered attrib-
utable to the decedent's predeceased spouse.77 This represents the
ancestral property basis of the in-law inheritance provisions which al-
lows property to be returned to the source from which it was de-
rived-in this case, the family of the decedent's predeceased spouse.78
The statute provides an all inclusive, though somewhat perplexing,
list of that property in the decedent's estate which is considered at-
tributable to a predeceased spouse. The four categories of property
are defined as follows:
(1) One-half of the community property in existence at the time of the death
of the predeceased spouse.
(2) One-half of any community property, in existence at the time of death of
the predeceased spouse, which was given to the decedent by the prede-
ceased spouse by way of gift, descent, or devise.
(3) That portion of any community property in which the predeceased spouse
had any incident of ownership and which vested in the decedent upon the
death of the predeceased spouse by right of survivorship.
(4) Any separate property of the predeceased spouse which came to the dece-
dent by gift, descent, or devise of the predeceased spouse or which vested
75. Id. § 6402.5(a)(4) (decedent's real property); id. § 6402.5(b)(4) (decedent's per-
sonal property).
76. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. The following is an example of
the four component requirements of section 6402.5. Assume W, died intestate in 1987
with no surviving husband or issue. Assume further that her husband, H, died in 1985
and left to W,, by way of a valid will, his share of the couple's real and personal com-
munity property and his separate property. At the time of Wl's death, H,'s father was
still living. The first component of the section is met since W, died with neither
spouse nor issue surviving. The second component is met, because W, did have a
spouse who predeceased her within 15 or 5 years for real and personal property, re-
spectively. The third component is met since the property received by W, from H,
would be considered property attributable to the predeceased spouse, HI. Finally, HI's
father is an individual within the categories of in-law takers. Therefore, the "attribu-
table" property (which came to W, from Hj) will return to H,'s family, passing to Hl's
father.
77. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(a), (b) (West Supp. 1989). See also supra notes 68-69
and accompanying text. In-laws could still possibly inherit intestate's property that is
not attributable to a predeceased spouse, but only on a last resort, anti-escheat basis,
and not in place of any living kindred of the decedent. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402(g)
(West Supp. 1989).
78. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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in the decedent upon the death of the predeceased spouse by right of
survivorship.
7 9
The first category of property represents what was, at the time of
the predeceased spouse's death, the predeceased spouse's one-half in-
terest in the couple's community property. 80 For example, assume
that H 1 and W, held Blackacre as community property at the time of
Hl's death in 1986. Wi became the sole owner of the property either
by devise of Hl's one-half interest through a valid will or by descent
through intestate succession. Blackacre was part of Wl's estate at her
death in 1987,81 then one-half of the property would be considered at-
tributable to H1, and therefore, subject to possible inheritance by HI's
relatives. The in-law inheritance provisions would generally not,
however, reach Hl's one-half interest in Blackacre if it was either not
part of Wl's estate at her death,82 or, alternatively, if it had been
transferred to someone other than W, either at or after Hl's death,
but nonetheless, ended up in Wl's estate at her death.83 This limita-
79. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f) (West Supp. 1989).
80. Although the statute does not specify which spouse's one-half interest in the
community property is considered attributable to the predeceased spouse, "[a]ncestral
property theory requires that the 'portion' be limited to interests once owned by [the
predeceased spouse] .... " Reppy & Wright, supra note 7, at 126. Prior to this state-
ment, the authors advance a technical, though admittedly conceptually illogical, argu-
ment that this property category could represent not the predeceased spouse's share of
the community property, but, rather, the surviving spouse's, now deceased, share. Id.
at 125, 126 & n.52. See infra note 85 and accompanying text dealing with the second
category of property defined as attributable to the predeceased spouse. See also CAL.
PROB. CODE § 6402.5(g) (West Supp. 1989) (community property includes quasi-commu-
nity property).
81. It is not necessary that the exact property be included in the estate of the sec-
ond spouse to die, but rather, it should be traceable to property which was community
property at the time of the death of the first spouse. See infra notes 122-23 and accom-
panying text.
82. By definition, the interest in question must be property in the decedent's es-
tate. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f) (West Supp. 1989). For example, if HI's one-half in-
terest in Blackacre vested in W, at HI's death, but prior to Wl's death, she disposed of
the property by gift, then Hl's kindred would not have any statutory interest in the
property by virtue of section 6402.5. But see infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text
regarding attributable property not in Wl's estate at her death, but where property in
her estate can be traced to the attributable property.
83. Estate of Bishop v. Donovan, 209 Cal. App. 2d 48, 59, 25 Cal. Rptr. 763, 770
(1962).
[E]ven though the property originally may have been owned by the prede-
ceased spouse, from whom it was obtained by the surviving spouse .... if the
latter at the time of death owned the property by virtue of an intervening
source, i.e., 'a new title,' distribution is made to the relatives of the surviving
[and not the predeceased] spouse.
Id. (citations omitted). An example is where H1 devised his one-half interest in Black-
acre to WI; W, gifted it to her mother who subsequently gave or devised it to W, who
died still holding the interest. See Estate of Westerman v. Westerman, 68 Cal. 2d 267,
tion is also generally true for the remaining three categories of prop-
erty deemed attributable to a predeceased spouse.8 4
The second category of property presents a definitional puzzle. It
is believed to represent the predeceased spouse's one-half share of
community property which was given to the other spouse (surviving
spouse) prior to the death of the first spouse.8 5 An example would be
where H, and W1 originally held Blackacre as community property,
but prior to the death of H1, he made an inter vivos gift of his one-
half interest to W1 . At Hi's death, W, already owns 100% of Black-
acre; but at her subsequent death, the one-half interest in Blackacre
acquired by gift from H, will be considered a portion of Blackacre at-
tributable to H1, and therefore, subject to possible inheritance by Hi's
relatives.
Proceeding to the third category of property, the level of confusion
increases as to what type of property it is intended to define. The dif-
ficulty with this category is that it speaks of "community property"
and "property vesting in the surviving spouse by right of survivor-
ship" as congruous concepts when, in fact, they are mutually exclu-
sive.8 6 It has been suggested, through a strained interpretation of the
statutory terms, that this property category may include "life insur-
437 P.2d 517, 66 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1968); In re Estate of Putnam, 219 Cal. 608, 28 P.2d 27
(1933); Estate of Blume v. People, 241 Cal. App. 2d 496, 50 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1966); Estate
of Flood v. Murphy, 55 Cal. App. 2d 410, 130 P.2d 811 (1942). See also infra notes 105-
07 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 83. The cases sited therein were decided prior to section 6402.5
and did not identify specific catagories of attributable property, but rather, were con-
cerned with broad definitions of attributable property which encompasses the current
catagories.
85. Reppy & Wright, supra note 7, at 125, 126 n.52. Definition of this category of
property is somewhat unclear due to two phrases used in the statute. The first is
"[o]ne-half of any community property, in existence at the time of the death of the
predeceased spouse." CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f)(2) (West Supp. 1989). The contro-
versy is whether the phrase means the property must exist as community property at
the time of the death of the predeceased spouse (referring to the property's status), or
alternatively, the property must have been community property at one time but need
only be in existence, not necessarily as community property, at the death of the prede-
ceased spouse. Reppy & Wright, supra note 7, at 125. The latter interpretation ap-
pears necessary in order for the statute to cover a one-half interest in community
property given by the predeceased spouse, before his death, to his spouse. Id. The sec-
ond phrase is "given to the decedent by the predeceased spouse by way of gift, descent,
or devise." CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f)(2) (West Supp. 1989). The controversy here
centers around the words "descent or devise." A gift of a community property interest
by the predeceased spouse is covered; but, the inclusion of "descent or devise" appears
to be surplusage, since descent or devise of a community property interest is already
covered by the first category of property in section 6402.5(f)(1). Commentators have
difficulty reconciling subsections 6402.5(f)(1) and (f)(2). However, they agree that,
when read together, the subsections cover community property interests acquired by
the surviving spouse via descent or devise as well as by gift (section 6402.5(f)(2) exclu-
sively). See Reppy & Wright, supra note 7, at 126 n.52.
86. Reppy & Wright, supra note 7, at 123 & n.46, 124.
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ance proceeds traceable to a community policy" 87 and, possibly, "com-
munity funds placed in a pay-on-death bank account or in a Totten
trust."88 Regardless of exactly what property this category is
designed to include, it apparently does not include any property
outside the scope of that considered to have had its source with the
predeceased spouse.89
The fourth and final category of property that is deemed to be at-
tributable to a predeceased spouse is clear in its intended scope. This
category represents the predeceased spouse's separate property which
was transferred to the other spouse either during the predeceased
spouse's lifetime by gift, or at death by descent, devise, or right of
survivorship. One example of this category would be where H1
owned Blackacre prior to his marriage to W1. During the marriage,
H1 transferred his entire separate property interest to W, through an
intervivos gift.90 At Wl's death, subsequent to Hl's death, her entire
interest in Blackacre (here 100%) would be considered attributable to
H 1, and therefore, subject to possible in-law inheritance. In the case
of separate property, it is the entire separate property interest trans-
ferred which is deemed attributable to the predeceased spouse, and
not just a one-half share as with the aforementioned community
property categories. 91
Despite the fact that the statute provides an all inclusive definition
or list of property considered attributable to a predeceased spouse, 92
there remains at least three potential source determination/appor-
tionment problem areas. The first such area is in determining the
87. Id at 124. "This requires straining the meaning of 'right of survivorship' so
that it refers instead to the intestate's having taken as beneficiary." Id; see also Estate
of Allie v. Cash, 50 Cal. 2d 794, 329 P.2d 903 (1958) (insurance purchased with commu-
nity funds held to be attributable to a predeceased spouse).
88. Reppy & Wright, supra note 7, at 124 n.49. Even if the definition requires de-
emphasis on the "right of survivorship" language, such property would come within
the scope of category four which deals with separate property of the predeceased
spouse. I&i
89. Id. at 124.
90. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f) (West Supp. 1989). Alternatively, transfer of
such interest to W, at the death of H, through devise, descent, or right of survivorship,
would yield identical results in this example. Id
91. If, in the alternative, H, were to give W, only a one-half interest in Blackacre
by changing the separate property status of Blackacre to community property, 100% of
Blackacre in Wl's estate would still be considered attributable to HI: one-half as H 1's
share of community property pursuant to section 6402.5(f)(1), and the other one-half,
representing Wl's share of community property which was a gift of separate property
from H1, pursuant to section 6402.5(f)(4). See also infra notes 98-110 and accompany-
ing text for related source discussion.
92. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f)(1)-(4) (West Supp. 1989).
true source of a property interest that, on its surface, fits within one
of the property categories. In other words, if property in a decedent's
estate appears to fit within one of the categories of property consid-
ered attributable to a predeceased spouse (e.g., Hl's interest in
jointly-owned property passing to W, by right of survivorship), then
is H, the true source of all or part of such interest passing to W, by
right of survivorship? As will be seen, the determination and appor-
tionment of the true source of spousal interests is critical to the ap-
plication of the in-law inheritance provisions.93
The second potential problem area is one of tracing. Property
which, at the time of the predeceased spouse's death, was admittedly
attributable to such spouse may be difficult to trace to the estate of
the second spouse to die.94 This problem becomes more acute as the
intervening period between the two deaths increases, 95 the original
property is transformed into other property, 96 and/or the property is
commingled with the surviving spouse's non-attributable property. 97
The third potential problem is determining the amount of property
considered attributable to a predeceased spouse when the value of
such property has changed during the period between the death of
the predeceased spouse and the death of the surviving spouse. The
question becomes how much, if any, of the change in value is prop-
erly apportioned to property deemed attributable to a predeceased
spouse; that is, what portion of the property's change in value is
shared by the decedent's in-laws?
A. Determining the True Source of Property Attributable to a
Predeceased Spouse
Section 6402.5(f)(1)-(4) defines the categories of property deemed
attributable to a predeceased spouse. Although the nature of the
property is such that it fits within an attributable property classifica-
tion, it may, nonetheless, be deemed property not subject to possible
in-law inheritance. The courts have made it clear that "[iun deter-
mining the character of property for the purpose of applying section
[6402.5] of the Probate Code, it is the source of its acquisition, and not
the nature of its ownership immediately before the death, which is
93. See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
94. See irkfra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
95. Of course, tracing problems evaporate if the intervening period exceeds the
statutory limitations of 15 years for real property, or 5 years for personal property.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(a) (West Supp. 1989).
96. Examples include sale or exchange of property, condemnation, or renumera-
tion due to casualty.
97. The simplest example of commingling occurs when cash attributable to a pre-
deceased spouse is mixed with the surviving spouse's funds. The problem is exacer-
bated when commingled funds are transformed through a subsequent purchase of
other property.
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controlling."9 8
In Estate of Abdale v. Department of Institutions,99 the husband,
shortly after marriage, transferred some of his separate property, by
way of gift, to himself and his wife as joint tenants. Upon the death
of his wife, he once again became vested in 100% of the property as
survivor. When he subsequently died intestate and without any issue
or a surviving spouse, a brother of his predeceased wife claimed in-
terest in one-half of this property on the basis that the predeceased
spouse was the source of a one-half interest.100 The court, although
recognizing that a one-half interest in the property technically met
the source requirements of the statute, denied inheritance by the de-
cedent's brother-in-law. The Court looked beyond the title of the
property at the death of the first spouse: "the property in question
did not have its origin or source as separate property of the prede-
ceased spouse since it was originally the separate property of the de-
cedent and any interest therein of the predeceased spouse came to
her as a gift from the decedent."11 In effect, "the decedent himself,
98. Estate of Reizian v. Johns, 36 Cal. 2d 746, 749, 227 P.2d 249, 250 (1951) (cita-
tions omitted); Estate of Westerman v. Westerman, 68 Cal. 2d 267, 271-72, 437 P.2d 517,
520, 66 Cal. Rptr. 29, 32 (1968); Estate of Hudspeth v. Earlywine, 225 Cal. App. 2d 759,
37 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1964). The Hudspeth court stated: "It is well settled that in deter-
mining the character of property for the purpose of applying section [6402.5], it is the
source of its acquisition and not the nature of its ownership immediately before death,
which is controlling." Id. at 762, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 780 (citations omitted). See also Es-
tate of Cline v. Schoonover, 214 Cal. App. 2d 152, 153, 29 Cal. Rptr. 495, 496 (1963); Es-
tate of Krey v. Galvas, 183 Cal. App. 2d 312, 316, 6 Cal. Rptr. 804, 806 (1960). Although
these decisions are pre-codification definitions of attributable property, there is no in-
dication such codification signals abandonment of underlying ancestral property roots
upon which source rules are based. "The ... [true source determination] approach to
construction of this legislation [addition of attributable property definitions] continues
to be very necessary if logical results are to be reached." Reppy & Wright, supra note
7, at 120; see also Estate of Nereson v. Nereson, 194 Cal. App. 3d 865, 871, 239 Cal. Rptr.
865, 868 (1987) (true source rules applicable to revised statute containing "attributable
property" definitions).
99. 28 Cal. 2d 587, 170 P.2d 918 (1946).
100. Id. at 588, 170 P.2d at 919-20. The statute in effect at the time of the case made
the in-law inheritance provisions applicable to separate property of the predeceased
spouse vesting in the surviving spouse by virtue of survivorship-in this case, the one-
half interest as a co-tenant. Id. at 588, 170 P.2d at 919. This would be comparable to
current section 6402.5(f)(4), which includes as property attributable to a predeceased
spouse, separate property of the predeceased spouse vesting in the'surviving spouse by
right of survivorship. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f)(4) (West Supp. 1989). See supra
notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
101. Abdale, 28 Cal. 2d at 589, 170 P.2d at 920. This situation should not be confused
with that of the gifting spouse predeceasing the donee spouse where the in-laws of the
gifting spouse may inherit on the subsequent death of the donee spouse. The Abdale
court recognized this difference and made the following observation in reaching their
decision:
and not the predeceased spouse, was the source of the property, for it
was acquired through his efforts before it came by gift to the prede-
ceased spouse." 102
The courts have not limited their denial of in-law inheritance to
situations where, as in Abdale, the surviving spouse was found to be
the true source of the property, even though the nature of title was
separate property of the predeceased spouse. In Estate of Riley v.
Riley, 03 the decedent's mother gave her residence to the decedent
and his wife who held the property as joint tenants. The decedent
acquired the entire property at the death of his wife by right of survi-
vorship. When the decedent died intestate without issue or spouse,
the court refused to allow the decedent's sister-in-law and half-
brother-in-law to inherit any portion of the residence. The Court de-
termined that the decedent's predeceased wife was not the true
source of any portion of the residence.104
Conversely, where the title of property at the death of the first
spouse truly reflects the predeceased spouse as the source of the
property, the application of the in-law inheritance provisions will,
nonetheless, be denied if the decedent acquired a new title to the
property in the intervening period prior to death.1o 5 In Estate of
Flood v. Murphy,106 for example, the surviving wife conveyed to her
daughter property previously acquired by gift from her predeceased
husband. Upon the daughter's death, the mother reacquired the
Thus if a husband gives his separate property to his wife and predeceases her,
on her death intestate leaving neither spouse nor issue his kin will inherit the
property under section . . . [6402.5]. It would be a strange anomaly if, should
he survive her and thereby reacquire the property, on his death intestate,
leaving neither spouse nor issue, not his kin but his wife's would inherit the
property under section [6402.5].
Id at 589-90, 170 P.2d at 920 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 591, 170 P.2d at 921; see also Estate of Cline v. Schoonover, 214 Cal. App.
2d 152, 29 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1963) (home held by husband and wife in joint tenancy had
true source as husband's separate property); Estate of McGee v. Seelig, 168 Cal. App.
2d 670, 336 P.2d 622 (1959) (husband and wife's joint tenancy property had true source
as husband's separate property).
103. 119 Cal. App. 3d 240, 173 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1981).
104. Id. at 210-11, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 816; see also Estate of Rudman v. Breese, 85 Cal.
App. 2d 270, 196 P.2d 39 (1948) (true source of property was not predeceased spouse
where property originally from decedent's brother and put into joint tenancy with de-
cedent and decedent's predeceased spouse).
In-law inheritance has also been denied where husband and wife joint tenancy was
created prior to their marriage. Estate of Hobart v. Hagist, 82 Cal. App. 2d 502, 187
P.2d 105 (1947) (true source of property was not predeceased spouse, but rather, an un-
married individual that ultimately became the decedent's spouse). Similarly, courts
have refused to allow in-law inheritance where the predeceased spouse was the donee
(spouse was not the donor) of a testamentary power of appointment which he exer-
cised in favor of his wife. Estate of Sevegney v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 44 Cal. App.
3d 467, 118 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1975) (property underlying power of appointment did not
have its source with predeceased spouse, but rather, with donor of power).
105. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
106. 55 Cal. App. 2d 410, 130 P.2d 811 (1942).
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property. When the surviving wife died, the court denied inheritance
by her in-laws. The decedent's reacquisition of the property from her
daughter created a new title in the decedent separate from that at-
tributable to the predeceased spouse.10 7 The court held as such de-
spite the fact that the surviving wife had originally acquired the
property from her predeceased husband by gift; and thus, the prede-
ceased husband was the true source of the property.10 8
The determination of the true source of a particular piece of prop-
erty is not necessarily an all or nothing proposition. In Abdale, the
decedent himself, and not the predeceased spouse, was found to be
the true source or origin of the. underlying property.109 The court,
however, indicated that a contribution of separate funds to the prop-
erty by the predeceased spouse could render a portion of such prop-
erty in the decedent's estate attributable to the predeceased
spouse.11 0
The practitioner should not be content with determining only the
title to the property at the death of the predeceased spouse for pur-
poses of establishing whether or not any portion of the decedent's
property is attributable to the predeceased spouse. Property that
solely by reason of its title fits within a statutory category deemed at-
tributable to a predeceased spouse does not assure application of the
in-law inheritance provisions. Only that property which fits within
an attributable property category based on both its title and its true
source is subject to possible inheritance by the decedent's in-laws.
107. Id. at 412, 130 P.2d at 812; see also Estate of Westerman v. Westerman, 68 Cal.
2d 267, 274, 437 P.2d 517, 521-22, 66 Cal. Rptr. 29, 33-34 (1968); In re Estate of Putnam,
219 Cal. 608, 610, 28 P.2d 27, 28 (1933); Estate of Blume v. People, 241 Cal. App. 2d 496,
500, 50 Cal. Rptr. 622, 624 (1966); Estate of Bishop v. Donovan, 209 Cal. App. 2d 48, 58,
25 Cal. Rptr. 763, 770 (1962).
108. Flood, 55 Cal. App. 2d at 411-12, 130 P.2d at 812.
109. Estate of Abdale v. Department of Inst., 28 Cal. 2d 587, 591, 170 P.2d 918, 921
(1946).
110. Id. at 592-93, 170 P.2d at 922. Contributions to the property by the predeceased
spouse had to be in the form of a gift, as opposed to a loan, for there to be a share of
the property attributable to the predeceased spouse. If contributions took the form of
a loan, it would represent a debt of the estate and not a portion attributable to the
predeceased spouse. Id. at 593, 170 P.2d at 922. For related matters on in-law's burden
of tracing the predeceased spouse's contributions to property in the decedent's estate,
see infra notes 111-30 and accompanying text. Additionally, for methods of apportion-
ing property in a decedent's estate to reflect partial interest attributable to the prede-
ceased spouse, see infra notes 131-208 and accompanying text.
B. Tracing Attributable Property to the Estate of the Surviving
Spouse
In-law inheritance requires both that the property in question be of
a category deemed attributable to a predeceased spouse"' and that
such property be part of the estate of the surviving spouse.11 2 The
burden of establishing that such requirements have been met rests
with the relatives of either the decedent or the predeceased spouse.
In Estate of Adams v. Ayers,113 the court developed a two-step proof
requirement. First, the burden is on the relatives of the predeceased
spouse to prove what portion of the property was either community
or separate property of the predeceased spouse." 4 "Second, the heirs
of the predeceased spouse have the burden of tracing [this property]
into the property found in the estate of the surviving spouse.""15
There is a rebuttable presumption that property acquired or in pos-
session during marriage is community property. 16 For purposes of
the first step, this presumption favors the relatives of the prede-
ceased spouse claiming an interest by way of the predeceased spouse's
interest in community property.1 1 7 Similarly, this presumption of
community status works against the relatives of the predeceased
spouse claiming interest by way of the predeceased spouse's separate
property."18
In the second step of the burden of proof, the assumptions regard-
ing the property's status are reversed: "the property in the estate of
the surviving spouse is [presumed to be] the separate property of the
surviving spouse, and... the heirs of the predeceased spouse must
overcome that presumption by tracing the [attributable] property...
111. See supra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
112. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f) (West Supp. 1989).
113. 132 Cal. App. 2d 190, 282 P.2d 190 (1955).
114. Id. at 204, 282 P.2d at 199. See also Estate of Hudspeth v. Earlywine, 225 Cal.
App. 2d 759, 762-63, 37 Cal. Rptr. 778, 780-81 (1964). These cases dealt only with the
attributable category of the predeceased spouse's interest in community property. The
same burden of proof has been applied to other categories of property deemed attribu-
table to a predeceased spouse. Estate of Bishop v. Donovan, 209 Cal. App. 2d 48, 54, 25
Cal. Rptr. 763, 766 (1962) (separate property of predeceased spouse); see Abdale, 28 Cal.
2d at 593, 170 P.2d at 922 (separate property of predeceased spouse).
115. Adams, 132 Cal. App. 2d at 204, 282 P.2d at 199.
116. Id, An in-depth discussion of the determination of property status during mar-
riage is beyond the scope of this practicum.
117. This includes attributable property categories specified in section 6402.5(f)(1)-
(3). This presumption of community property makes it incumbent upon the relatives
of the decedent to rebut the presumption of community property and to prove that the
status of the property is otherwise. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f)(1)-(3) (West Supp.
1989).
118. This includes the attributable property category specified in section
6402.5(f)(4). The presumption makes it incumbent upon the relatives of the prede-
ceased spouse to rebut the presumption of community property and prove that the sta-
tus of the property is the decedent's separate property. See CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 6402.5(f)(4) (West Supp. 1989).
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into the estate of the surviving spouse." 1 9 If the claimant relatives
of the predeceased spouse fail to overcome this presumption, then
"the property in the estate of the surviving spouse must be treated as
separate property of the surviving spouse and distributed to his blood
heirs."120
Historically, tracing attributable property to the estate of the dece-
dent was relatively simple. Under the common law ancestral prop-
erty theory, for property in the estate of the decedent to revert to the
relatives of a predeceased spouse, it had to be identical to that which
came from the predeceased spouse.1 21 Therefore, tracing was merely
a matter of determining whether the exact property deemed attribu-
table to a predeceased spouse was in the estate of the decedent. This
exact conformity of property, however, has never carried over as a
requirement in the California application of the in-law inheritance
provisions.122 Therefore, property in the hands of the surviving
spouse which is deemed attributable to a predeceased spouse can be
transformed in any number of ways1 23 and still retain its character as
property attributable to a predeceased spouse.
When attributable property has been transformed and/or commin-
gled with the surviving spouse's separate property, the task of tracing
can become difficult for the decedent's in-laws.124 Adequate tracing
is generally a question of fact,125 and "the ordinary rules applicable
119. Adams, 132 Cal. App. 2d at 204, 282 P.2d at 199 (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Ferrier, Gifts to "Heirs" in California, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 413, 431 (1938).
122. In re Estate of Brady, 171 Cal. 1, 4-5, 151 P. 275, 276 (1915). This follows the
general theory of determining status of property in that:
property does not lose its character or status as separate or community prop-
erty, by a mere change in form or identity, because of a substitution of other
property in the usual manner of sale or exchange, and that interest, rents, or
profits therefrom retain the character in this respect of the property from
which they are derived.
Id. at 5, 151 P.2d 276 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
123. Examples of transformation could include selling property and reinvesting the
proceeds, exchanging the property for other property, receipt of insurance due to casu-
alty, receipt of money due to condemnation, and the like.
124. The commingling of property and/or funds is not necessarily fatal. Estate of
Nereson v. Nereson, 194 Cal. App. 3d 865, 875, 239 Cal. Rptr. 865, 871 (1987). The court
stated that "[p]roperty can.., be 'commingled' without destroying the charactbr of the
contributions, as long as the respective amounts can be ascertained." Id. (citations
omitted). See also Estate of Neilson v. Neilson, 57 Cal. 2d 733, 744, 371 P.2d 745, 751, 22
Cal. Rptr. 1, 5-6 (1962) (commingling did not make the entire property community in
nature because property could be traced to both separate and community sources).
125. Nereson, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 873, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 869; Estate of Adams v.
Ayers, 132 Cal. App. 2d 190, 204, 282 P.2d 190, 199 (1955); In re Estate of Bryant v.
Greenleaf, 3 Cal. 2d 58, 68, 43 P.2d 529, 533 (1935).
to tracing property apply."126
The Adams court identified two situations in which an inference
can arise rebutting the presumption that property in the decedent's
estate was the decedent's separate property. 127 "[I]f the first spouse
dies after a long married life, and shortly thereafter the surviving
spouse dies, there being no evidence that the surviving spouse was
gainfully employed, the inference that the property was community
will support the finding to that effect." 128 Similarly, "[e]vidence that
the surviving spouse over a 10-year period received no gift or income
that could be characterized as separate will support the inference
that the property that was community on the death of the prede-
ceased spouse remained such until the death of the surviving
spouse." 129 Lastly, it is incumbent upon those claiming inheritance
by virtue of property attributable to a predeceased spouse to prove
that they are in fact a relative of the predeceased spouse to which the
in-law inheritance provisions apply.13 0
C. Apportioning Changes in Value to Attributed Property
Subsequent to the death of the predeceased spouse, property attrib-
utable to such spouse may experience an increase in value and/or an
increase in the income generated therefrom.131 This may be the re-
sult of natural market conditions. Alternatively, all or a portion of
such enhancements may be due to the efforts and/or infusion of capi-
tal by the surviving spouse during the period following the death of
the first spouse. During this period there may also be an increase in
126. Adams, 132 Cal. App. 2d at 204, 282 P.2d at 199. Discussion of these rules is
beyond the scope of this practicum.
127. Id. at 204, 205, 282 P.2d at 199-200. Adams and the cases cited in the following
two footnotes deal with attributable property in the form of the predeceased spouse's
one-half share of community property being traced to the decedent's estate. The infer-
ence should also have applicability to tracing the predeceased spouse's separate prop-
erty to the decedent's estate. See infra notes 128-29.
128. Id. at 205, 282 P.2d at 199-200 (citing Estate of Bryant v. Greenleaf, 3 Cal. 2d 58,
43 P.2d 529 (1935)). In Bryant, the court used language that the former community
property is "presumed" to be in the estate of the decedent under these circumstances.
Bryant, 3 Cal. 2d at 68, 43 P.2d at 533. The use of this language appears somewhat loose
and "[s]urely this fact raises no more than an inference which is sufficient to overcome
the ordinary presumption." Reppy & Wright, supra note 7, at 134 n.73.
129. Adams, 132 Cal. App. 2d at 205, 282 P.2d at 200 (citing Estate of Jolly v. Rea,
196 Cal. 547, 238 P. 353 (1925)).
130. Estate of Rattray v. Rennie, 13 Cal. 2d 702, 706, 91 P.2d 1042, 1044-45 (1939). In
a related matter, the relatives of the decedent must provide notice to the predeceased
spouse's relatives when there is personal property in excess of a specified statutory
amount. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(d) (West Supp. 1989).
131. This discussion is in reference to the period after the death of the predeceased
spouse. Such an increase in value or increase in revenues can also occur prior to the
death of the predeceased spouse but subsequent to the predeceased spouse's gift of his
share of community property or his separate property pursuant to sections 6402.5(f)(2)
and 6402.5(f)(4), respectively. See Cal. Prob. Code § 6402.5(f)(2), (4) (West Supp. 1989).
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equity of leveraged attributable property by the surviving spouse's
payments of debt principal. At the subsequent death of the surviving
spouse, the question then becomes, to what degree do the decedent's
in-laws share in the income and changes in value of this attributable
property?
In determining the true source of property attributable to a prede-
ceased spouse, it is proper to apportion their respective interests
based on contributions when both spouses separately contributed to
property.' 32 The California Court of Appeal has recently acknowl-
edged that expanding this concept of apportionment to reflect "con-
tributions"133 by the surviving spouse during the period following the
death of the first spouse "is not inconsistent... with the general pur-
pose behind the [in-law inheritance] statute."134
In Estate of Nereson v. Nereson,135 the court indicated that the in-
law inheritance sections of the Probate Code "cannot be seen as sim-
ple succession statutes. Their application necessarily requires resort
to rules governing community property as well as intestacy."136 On
the issue of determining what portion of the increase in value of at-
tributable property should pass to the decedent's in-laws, the court
stated that "the rules of apportionment commonly used to determine
community and separate interests of the spouses following separation
are appropriate .... ,3 7
For purposes of examining the apportionment rules in an in-law in-
heritance framework, the following four scenarios will be used as a
basis for discussion: (1) the increase in the value of and/or income
from the attributable property subsequent to the death of H1 due to
natural market conditions and not to any contributions or efforts on
the part of W1, the surviving spouse; (2) all or a portion of the in-
creased revenues and value due to the personal efforts of WI subse-
quent to the death of H1; (3) the attributable property appreciation
due to natural market conditions, but increased equity of such prop-
erty due to payments of principal by W, subsequent to the death of
H1; and (4) all or a portion of the increased revenues and value due to
132. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. Apportionment in that context is
related to contributions by each spouse prior to the death of the first spouse.
133. Contributions need not necessarily be in the form of capital. See infra notes
145-71 and accompanying text.
134. In re Estate of Nereson, 194 Cal. App. 3d 865, 871, 239 Cal. Rptr. 865, 868
(1987).
135. 194 Cal. App. 3d 865, 239 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1987).
136. Id. at 871, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 868 (citation omitted).
137. Id. at 875, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
infusions of capital by W, subsequent to the death of H. Although
each scenario is discussed as an individual fact pattern, actual situa-
tions involving apportionment may represent a combination of the
apportionment methods discussed.
1. Changes in Value and Revenues Due Solely to Natural
Market Conditions
It is well established in California that
property does not lose its character or status as separate or community prop-
erty, by a mere change in form or identity, because of a substitution of other
property in the usual manner of sale or exchange, and that interest, rents, or
profits therefrom retain the character in this respect of the property from
which they were derived. 1 3 8
Therefore, any increases in income or value of property attributable
to H1 , not associated with efforts or contributions by W, subsequent
to the death of H1, will be shared by Wl's in-laws at her death.
139 Of
course, Wl's in-laws have the burden of tracing the attributable assets
to her estate. 140
To illustrate, assume the following facts: H and W, owned a house
as community property, worth $100,000 at the death of H1. Addition-
ally, H owned, as his separate property, 100 shares of Able Company
common stock which he bequeathed to W1, having a fair market
value of $80,000 at his death. At her death a few years later, W, still
owned the house, but its value had increased to $250,000. Prior to her
death, W, sold the Able stock and reinvested all of the proceeds in
Baker Company common stock. Baker subsequently merged with
Charlie Company and W, received the latter's stock in exchange for
her Baker stock. At her death, the Charlie stock was worth $150,000.
During the period from Hl's death to Wl's death, these three compa-
nies paid dividends totaling $20,000. W, did not play an active role in
the management of any of the assets, nor did she make any capital
contributions to such assets subsequent to the death of H1.
At Wl's death, one-half of the residence, although actually owned
100% by W, at her death, would be considered property attributable
138. In re Estate of Brady, 171 Cal. 1, 5, 151 P. 275, 276 (1915) (emphasis in original,
citations omitted).
139. Id,; see also Estate of Bishop v. Donovan, 209 Cal. App. 2d 48, 61, 25 Cal. Rptr.
763, 771 (1962) (increase due to efforts of surviving spouse is not subject to in-law in-
heritance); Estate of Adams v. Ayers, 132 Cal. App. 2d 190, 202, 282 P.2d 190, 198 (1955)
(increase due to no effort of the possessor is shared as if part of the original property);
Logan v. Forster, 114 Cal. App. 2d 587, 598-99, 250 P.2d 730, 737 (1952) (natural rents,
issues and profits take the same character as the property producing them).
140. Tracing may or may not be an easy task as to the property principal. See
supra notes 111-30 and accompanying text. Tracing may be even more difficult for rev-
enues of attributable property since such revenues may no longer be related to the
property itself. For example, rental income from attributable property may be placed
in decedent's checking account which is used for living expenses.
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to the predeceased spouse, H 1 .141 Hi's relatives would share fully in
the property's appreciation and would thus have a claim to one-half
of the full $250,000 fair market value, or $125,000. This is despite the
fact that Hi's community property share of the residence was worth
only $40,000 at his death. Unlike the residence, which was considered
fifty percent attributable to H1 since it was originally community
property in the hands of H1 and W1, all of the Charlie Company com-
mon stock would be considered property attributable to the prede-
ceased spouse, since it was originally his separate property.142 It does
not matter that Hi's separate property consisted of Able Company
stock at his death and that subsequent to his death the stock was
transformed into other assets. As long as Hl's relatives can trace the
Able Company stock and/or the proceeds from its sale to assets in
Wl's estate, such property will not lose its attributable character.143
Similar to the residence, the full fair market value at the death of W1
is the determinative amount-in this case, $150,000. Lastly, assuming
Hl's relatives can trace the $20,000 in dividends from the attributable
stock to Wl's estate, they will also be entitled to such amounts.
44
2. Changes in Value and Revenue Due to the Efforts of the
Surviving Spouse
Although the decedent's in-laws may share fully in appreciation
and/or increases in income from attributable property, they do not do
so when such occurs as the result of efforts of the surviving spouse
subsequent to the death of the first spouse.' 45 In these situations, the
problem becomes one of apportioning values to reflect the efforts of
the surviving spouse.
As previously indicated, the in-law inheritance provisions rely
141. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f)(1) (West Supp. 1989). This assumes that the origi-
nal ownership was truly community property and did not have some other actual
source. See supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text.
142. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f)(4) (West Supp. 1989). This assumes that the origi-
nal source of the property was truly separate property.
143. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. The decedent's in-laws may be en-
titled to more or less than $20,000 in the present example. If the dividends were rein-
vested when received by Wl, Hl's relatives would be entitled to whatever the value of
such reinvested proceeds happened to be at W,'s death, assuming, of course, that there
is adequate tracing.
145. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; see also Estate of Bishop v. Dono-
van, 209 Cal. App. 2d 48, 61, 25 Cal. Rptr. 763, 771 (1962) ("any increase in the value
thereof which due to the personal activity, ability or capacity of [WI], through services
rendered after death of [H], is not subject to succession under these provisions") (cita-
tions omitted).
heavily on community property concepts.146 In the family law con-
text, there is a scenario that somewhat parallels the apportionment
problem at hand. This situation arises when one spouse brings sepa-
rate property into the marriage in the form of a business or real es-
tate. During the marriage, through the efforts of one spouse, the
value and/or profits from the business or real estate increases. At
the death of one spouse or at the dissolution of the marriage, it is
necessary to determine the community and separate property inter-
ests. As a result, the parties are faced with a problem similar to in-
law inheritance: determining how much of the enhancement is at-
tributable to the original separate property versus the community ef-
forts during marriage.147 Since no one method of apportionment is
considered mandatory,148 the courts can use any method of appor-
tionment they deem most equitable based on the facts and circum-
stances. 149 Two general methods of apportionment enjoy wide
acceptance: the Pereira 150 and Van Camp 151 approaches.
In a family law context, the Pereira approach recognizes that the
underlying separate property will experience a reasonable rate of ap-
preciation and/or generate a reasonable degree of revenue.152 This
reasonable rate of return is deemed the separate property of the
spouse who brought the property into the marriage; any actual excess
appreciation and/or revenue generated is considered community
property. 5 3 Approaching the problem from the opposite side, the
Van Camp method recognizes that the spouse's services should be as-
signed a reasonable value, representing the value of the community
property interest. The balance of any actual appreciation and/or rev-
enue is allocated to the original separate property interest.154
The in-law inheritance apportionment problem is, in effect, the in-
146. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
147. During a marriage, the efforts or services rendered by one spouse are consid-
ered community in nature. Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909); In re Mar-
riage of Marsden, 130 Cal. App. 3d 426, 181 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1982); Van Camp v. Van
Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921).
148. Logan v. Forster, 114 Cal. App. 2d 587, 600, 250 P.2d 730, 738 (1952).
149. Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 18, 490 P.2d 257, 261, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137,
141 (1971); Estate of Gold v. Gold, 170 Cal. 621, 623, 151 P. 12, 13 (1915); Estate of Ner-
eson v. Nereson, 194 Cal. App. 3d 865, 876, 239 Cal. Rptr. 865, 871-72 (1987).
150. Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909).
151. Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921).
152. Pereira, 156 Cal. at 7, 103 P. at 490-91. There is no definitive rule on what is
considered a fair rate of return. Todd v. McColgan, 89 Cal. App. 2d 509, 201 P.2d 414
(1949). However, unless there is support for a more realistic rate, the prevailing rate
of legal interest will generally be used. Beam, 6 Cal. 3d at 19-20, 490 P.2d at 262, 98
Cal. Rptr. at 142-43. The fair rate of return for real estate can be the average rate of
return for property which is similarly situated. Nereson, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 239
Cal. Rptr. at 871.
153. Pereira, 156 Cal. at 7, 103 P. at 490-91.
154. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. at 27-29, 199 P. at 890-91.
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verted image of the classic family law apportionment problem ad-
dressed by both the Pereira and Van Camp approaches. Instead of
measuring the amount by which separate property acquired prior to
marriage was enhanced by community efforts during marriage, the
in-law inheritance apportionment problem involves measuring the
amount by which attributable property of the deceased spouse (either
community or separate property) was enhanced by "separate prop-
erty" efforts or the surviving spouse.155 The Pereira and Van Camp
apportionment methods have suggested application to this type of re-
verse apportionment situation in the family law context.156 These
methods are viewed as having logical application to the post-death ap-
portionment problem associated with the in-law inheritance provi-
sions.157 In Nereson, the court explained the application of the two
methods to the in-law inheritance apportionment situation:
[T]he Pereira formula would assign a fair return to the [attributable] property
share, as that share is valued at the time of the first death... . In cases where"
the survivor has improved the property with labor .... this approach operates
to allocate to the [attributable property] only the natural increase over time,
while the heirs of the survivor reap the benefits of his additional contribu-
tions.... The Van Camp formula would assign a value to the survivor's con-
tributions and allocate this amount to the separate property share.
1 5 8
To illustrate: H, and W, acquired a piece of unimproved real estate
during their marriage and held it as community property. At Hl's
death in 1977, the real estate was worth $100,000 and Hl's one-half in-
terest in the property was devised to W 1. The property was not gen-
erating any income. During the two years ending with her death in
1987, Wi, an attorney, devoted much of her time to the property in-
cluding planning for the subdivision of the property,. negotiating fu-
ture building and lease agreements, and securing all necessary
building permits. When W, died intestate without surviving issue or
155. The status of apportioned property representing services performed by the
surviving spouse would have to be deemed separate property of the surviving spouse
by the very nature of the marital status of the surviving spouse; that is, the community
nature of the husband and wife relationship ends at the death of one spouse.
156. In re Marriage of Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 438-39, 119 Cal. Rptr. 590, 594
(1975) (apportionment of community property after separation due to separate prop-
erty efforts).
157. Reppy & Wright, supra note 7, at 135. "If there was such labor [of surviving
spouse], a kind of Pereira-Van Camp apportionment seems to be called for .... Id
(citations omitted); see Nereson, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 875, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
158. Nereson, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (citations omitted). Ner-
eson involved what is now the first category of attributable property, the predeceased
spouse's share of community property. There is no reason to believe that the two ap-
proaches would not be equally viable when dealing with the remaining categories of
attributable property.
a new spouse, the property was worth $600,000. Other unimproved
real estate in the area had experienced annual appreciation at the
rate of ten percent per year during the ten-year period from 1977 to
1987.
At the time of Hl's death, the portion of the property attributable
to him was his one-half share of the property having a value of
$50,000.159 If the property had appreciated to $600,000 at Wl's death
solely due to market conditions and not as a result of any efforts or
capital contributions by W1, the portion attributable to H , would be
$300,000.160 However, W
, 
did contribute her efforts; therefore, appor-
tionment of part of the appreciation is appropriate.
Using the Pereira approach, a fair return on the original $50,000
share, attributable to H1, would have to be determined. In the case of
real estate, "a fair return [can] be calculated by reference to the aver-
age annual appreciation rate for real property in the area."'161 In the
present example, applying the ten percent average annual rate of ap-
preciation for other property in the area yields an appreciated value
of approximately $130,000 at Wl's death for the original $50,000 at-
tributable share.162 Therefore, $130,000 represents the share deemed
attributable to H, and subject to inheritance by Wl's in-laws, with the
balance of the property, $470,000, inheritable by WI's relatives.163
Utilizing the Van Camp approach, the value of Wl's services would
have to be determined. This is probably a more difficult proposition
than determining a fair return under the Pereira approach. If there
is only a minimal amount of effort or time expended, the courts are
reluctant to allocate any value to such services. 64 However, if the
amount of effort or time expended is significant, then expert testi-
mony is utilized to determine the value of Wl's services. Considera-
tion is given to the following factors: (1) the time spent with regard
to the subject property or business; (2) the nature and importance of
the rendered services; and (3) the type and risk factors associated
with property or business.165 In the present example, assume Wl's
services are valued at $120,000, thus representing the portion of the
appreciation not attributable to H1 . Therefore, a total of $240,000 is
159. Property is attributable to the predeceased spouse via section 6402.5(f)(1). See
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
160. This represents the one-half share of $600,000. See supra notes 138-44 and ac-
companying text.
161. Nereson, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
162. For example, $50,000 increased at the rate of 10% per year compounded annu-
ally would grow to $129,687 at the end of 10 years.
163. The balance of $470,000 is computed by subtracting the $130,000 attributable to
the predeceased spouse from the $600,000 aggregate value of the property.
164. Estate of Ney v. Morgan, 212 Cal. App. 2d 891, 28 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1963); Cozzi v.
Cozzi, 81 Cal. App. 2d 229, 183 P.2d 739 (1947).
165. CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW SERVICE § 12:38, at 548 (E. Jessen ed. 1986).
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deemed attributable to H1 and subject to in-law inheritance, with the
balance of $360,000 inheritable by Wl's relatives. 66
In theory, both methods should produce identical results.16 7 In re-
ality, however, this may not be the case. In above-average growth sit-
uations, the Pereira approach will likely apportion more to
attributable property than will the Van Camp method.168 To help re-
lieve these variances among methods, some courts have used a combi-
nation of the two methods which apportions property based on
relative percentages of both the computed fair return and the fair
value of the services. 16 9 This approach appears to strike a logical bal-
ance between the two methods and would seem particularly well-
suited to apportionment within the in-law inheritance arena. 170 In
the present example, the combination of the two methods would
yield an attributable amount to H1 of approximately $192,857, with
the balance of $407,143 available to Wl's relatives. 17 1
166. A total of $480,000 ($600,000 less $120,000 as the value of W1's services) would
represent the increased value of the total original community property interest, one-
half of which ($240,000) represents the share attributable to H1. The balance appor-
tioned to W, is the total value ($600,000) less the share attributable to H1 ($240,000), or
$340,000.
167. Messinger, Unification of the Pereira and Van Camp Rules: The Economics
Underlying the Division of a Business Between Separate and Community Property in
California Divorce Proceedings, 9 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 286, 287 (1982).
168. Id. at 296.
169. Todd v. McColgan, 89 Cal. App. 2d 509, 201 P.2d 414 (1949). See infra note 171
for an example of the application of the combination approach.
170. Since this method combines the two approaches, it is less likely that the appor-
tionment will be skewed in favor of either party by a singularly inaccurate estimate of
either the fair return or the reasonable value of the efforts of the survivor. The
probability of inaccurate or inflated estimates of either factor, thereby creating more
of a skewed result, would seem to be more likely to occur in an in-law inheritance situ-
ation as opposed to the typical family law situation. In the former, neither party is
alive to possibly offer and rebut the testimony establishing the particular valuations.
171. The amounts are computed as follows:
Amount Attributable to H1-
Fair return via Pereira ($130,000 fair value less
original cost of $50,000) $80,000 x 2 (H 1 & W1) $160,000
Fair value of services via Van Camp 120.000
$280,000
Relative value of Pereira return
($160,000) to total ($280,000) 57.14%
Multiplied by total appreciation ($500,000) $285,714
Plus: original cost 100.000
Total community property share of property $385,714
One-half attributable to H 1  $192.M57
859
3. Increase in Equity From Payments of Debt Principal On
Encumbered Property by Surviving Spouse
Where the attributable property is encumbered at the time of
transfer to the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse may subse-
quently make payments towards the debt principal. Although reduc-
ing the debt on property does not alone increase the value of the
property, it does increase the owner's equity in the property.172 Fur-
ther, the property can experience normal appreciation during the pe-
riod in which the debt payments are being made. As such, the
property's equity/appreciation and generated income may require
apportioning.
Apportionment in this situation depends on the source of the funds
used by the surviving spouse for the debt principal payments. When
the source of the debt payments is the same as the source of property
deemed attributable to a predeceased spouse, no apportionment is
necessary; the in-laws would share in the property to the same de-
gree as in the first scenario above.17s However, when the source of
the debt payments differs from the source category of the underlying
attributable property, apportionment is required.174
In Nereson, the situation existed where the surviving spouse, sub-
sequent to the death of the first spouse, paid off a mortgage on their
appreciated residence, formerly the couple's community property.
The court recognized that apportionment of the property at the sub-
sequent death of the surviving spouse was appropriate unless the de-
cedent's in-laws met the burden of proving that the source of funds
used to make such debt payments were not the separate funds of the
Amount Not Attributable to H,:
Total value of property $600,000
Less: amount attributable to H1 (as above) (192.857)
Amount not attributable to H $40L.
172. Equity equals the total value of the property less encumbrances thereon.
173. This is because the payments would be attributable property just like the un-
derlying property. See generally supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text. Examples
include the following: (1) where the attributable property is the former community
property interest of the predeceased spouse and the debt payments are made from for-
mer community property sources (i.e., attributable as former community property in
their own right); and (2) where the attributable property is the former separate prop-
erty of the predeceased spouse and the debt payments are made from former separate
property of the predeceased spouse. Of course, in these situations the predeceased
spouse's relatives have the burden of not only tracing the underlying encumbered or
formerly encumbered property to an attributable source, but also of tracing the source
of the debt payments to such source. See supra notes 111-30 and accompanying text.
174. Examples include: (1) where the underlying property has an attributable
source to the former community property interest of H1 and debt payments made from
Wl's separate property funds subsequent to H1 's death; and (2) where the underlying
property has an attributable source to the former separate property of H1 and debt
payments subsequent to his death are made by W, from either a former community
property source or W1 's separate property.
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surviving spouse.175 The court suggested using the Pereira/Van
Camp method of apportionment.1 7 6 These methods, however, are ap-
plicable in situations where the value of property has been enhanced
by the services of one spouse.177 Reducing the existing debt associ-
ated with a piece of property is conceptually dissimilar to enhancing
the property by one's services. Rather, it is more akin to determining
the make-up of the property's original contribution base.
A more appropriate method of apportionment, may exist, derived
from the family law context where encumbered separate property is
brought into a marriage and community funds are subsequently used
to make payments reducing the principal debt. Through a series of
complex cases, the California courts have developed a methodology
for such apportionment.178
A principal case was the California Supreme Court's 1980 decision
in In re Marriage of Moore.179 The wife brought property into the
marriage which she had purchased prior to the marriage with her
separate property consisting of a down payment and mortgage for the
balance.1 8 0 During the marriage, the couple paid part of the mort-
gage debt with community funds.181 At the time of divorce, the prop-
erty had appreciated substantially in value. 182 The court apportioned
the value of the property as follows: First, it reimbursed each party
for their actual share of principal payments and down payment.
Then the court allocated the total appreciation value to each spouse
175. Estate of Nereson v. Nereson, 194 Cal. App. 3d 865, 239 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1987).
See also supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text regarding presumptions of property
source.
176. Nereson, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 875, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 147-51.
178. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980);
In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980); In re
Marriage of Marsden, 130 Cal. App. 3d 426, 181 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1982); In re Marriage of
Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979); Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App.
222, 251 P. 640 (1926). For an excellent discussion on the historical perspective of these
cases, see Wagner, Apportionment of Home Equity in Marital Dissolution Under Cali-
fornia Community Property Law: Is the Current Approach Equitable?, 9 COMMUNITY
PROP. J. 31 (1982); Comment, Computation of Proportionate Ownership of the Family
Residence Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 15 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 289 (1982).
179. 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980).
180. Id. at 370, 618 P.2d at 209, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 663. The original purchase price of
the property was $56,640.57, comprised of a $16,640.57 down payment and a mortgage
of $40,000 for the balance of the purchase price. Id.
181. Id. As to the debt principal, $5,986.20 was paid with community funds during
marriage. The wife paid an aggregate of $826.25 of debt principal before marriage and
after the separation. Id.
182. The appreciated value at the time of trial was $160,000.
based on their relative contributions to the original purchase price
giving the wife credit for the amount of the original loan less princi-
pal payments made with community funds.1 8 3
In In re Marriage of Marsden,18 4 the formula was refined: First,
allocate 100% of the appreciation occurring before the marriage to
the spouse owning the separate property. Then, use the Moore ap-
proach to apportion the balance of the appreciation.l8 5
Extending this methodology to apportionment within an in-law in-
heritance context would once again call for application of the princi-
pals in reverse.1 8 6 Assume that during their marriage, H1 and W,
purchased a house for $100,000, in 1975 with a down payment of
$20,000 and a $80,000 mortgage. During their marriage, $10,000 was
paid towards the $80,000 loan principal. The down payment and loan
payments were made with community funds, and the house was held
as community property. At Hl's death in 1980, the fair market value
of the house had increased to $160,000. W, continued to live in the
183. Moore, 28 Cal. 3d at 373-74, 618 P.2d at 211-12, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665-66. Appor-
tionment is as follows:
Purchase price $ 56,640.57
Down payment 16,640.57
Loan 40,000.00
Market value at time of trial 160,000.00
Capital appreciation 103,359.43
Separate Property Interest:
Return of down payment $ 16,640.57
Return of amount of reduction of principal by
separate funds:
Before marriage 245.18
After separation 581.07
Credit for down payment $16,640.57
and loan proceeds 40,000.00
Less: Amount of reduction of principal by community
funds (5.986,20)
$ 50,654.37
Divided by purchase price $ 56,654.57
Equals percentage of capital appreciation attributable
to separate property 89.43%
Multiplied by capital appreciation ($103,359.57) 92.434.34
$109,901.16
Community Property Interest:
Return of amount of reduction of principal by commu-
nity funds $ 5,986.20
Amount of reduction of principal by community funds $ 5,986.20
Divided by purchase price $56,640.57
Equals percentage of capital appreciation attributa-
ble to community property 10.57%
Multiplied by capital appreciation ($103,359.43) 10.925.09
$ 16,911.29
See Wagner, supra note 178, at 34.
184. 130 Cal. App. 3d 426, 181 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1982).
185. Marsden, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 437-40, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 915-17 (1982).
186. The Pereira and Van Camp apportionment approaches have been applied in
"reverse" in post-death situations. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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house until her death in 1987. During those seven years, she paid off
an additional $15,000 of the loan principal using her separate (non-
attributable) funds. At her death, the value of the house had appreci-
ated to $280,000. Apportionment of the equity using a reverse Moore!
Marsden approach would result in a total attributable amount subject
to possible in-law inheritance of $96,000 and an amount not subject to
in-law inheritance of $129,000, computed as follows:
Summary of Costs and Values
Purchase price $100,000
Down payment 20,000
Original loan amount 80,000
Market value at H,'s death 160,000
Appreciation as of Hl's death 60,000
Market value at W,'s death 280,000
Appreciation between deaths of H, & W, 120,000
Community Property Interest Attributable to H:
Return of down payment $ 20,000
Return of principal payments from community 10,000
Return of appreciation occurring during
marriage before death of H, (Marsden) 60,000
Apportionment of appreciation after H,'s death:
Credit for down payment $ 20,000
Credit for original loan proceeds 80,000
Less: Reduction of principal by
W, after H,'s death (15,000)
$ 85,000
Divided by purchase price $100,000
Equals percentage of appreciation
attributable to community property 85%
Multiplied by appreciation after
death of H, ($120,000) 102.000
Total community property interest $192,000
One-half attributable to H118 7  $96000
Value not attributable to H:
Return of principal payments by W,
after the death of H, $ 15,000
Apportionment of appreciation after Hl's death:
Reduction of principal by W, $ 15,000
Divided by purchase price $100,000
Equals percentage of appreciation
attributable to community property 15%
Multiplied by appreciation after
death of H, ($120,000) 18.000
Total separate property interest $ 33,000
Plus: W,'s One-half community property interest 96.00
Total value not attributable to H, $129.QQ
187. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402.5(f)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
In computing the allocation of appreciation after HI's death, the
community property interest is credited with the full remaining bal-
ance of the loan, 8 8 thereby increasing the final amount attributable
to the predeceased spouse, H1. This has been the source of criticism
regarding the Moore formula, where in the family law context, it is
the separate property interest which receives the boost.189
Although application of the in-law inheritance provisions draws
heavily from community property concepts, 90 strict application of
the Moore/Marsden approach to apportionment within the in-law in-
heritance context may not be appropriate. Specifically, crediting the
entire unpaid loan balance to the attributable portion when allocat-
ing post-death (of the first spouse) appreciation does not appear to be
an equitable proposition. The appreciation in question is that which
has occurred after the death of H1, a period when H is no longer po-
tentially liable for the debt. It seems ironic that during this period
while W, is potentially liable for the debt, such debt works to in-
crease not her separate interest in the property, but rather, the por-
tion attributed to her predeceased spouse H1. In the above example,
if W1, instead of H1, was credited with the unpaid loan balance, the
total attributable amount subject to possible in-law inheritance would
decrease to $63,000 while the amount inheritable by Wl's relatives
would increase to $162,000.191
Another approach or modification of the Moore formula has been
suggested. This approach allocates the appreciation based on respec-
tive separate and community contributions towards the down pay-
ment and the actual debt principal payments while giving credit to
188. As part of the computation of the 85% apportionment to the community prop-
erty share, such share was given credit for $65,000 of loan amount ($80,000 original
loan balance less $15,000 paid after HI's death). The loan amount is actually a combi-
nation of the loan balance at W,'s death of $55,000 ($80,000 original balance less $15,000
paid with Wl's separate funds and $10,000 paid with community funds) plus the $10,000
of loan principal paid with community funds while both H, and W, were alive.
189. Wagner, supra note 178, at 34.
190. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
191. The computations of the attributable and separate interests are as follows:
Summary of Costs and Values
Purchase price $100,000
Down payment 20,000
Original loan amount 80,000
Market value at HI's death 160,000
Appreciation as of HI's death 60,000
Market value at W1's death 280,000
Appreciation between deaths of H, & W $120,000
Community Property Interest Attributable to H1:
Return of down payment $ 20,000
Return of principal payments from community 10,000
Return of appreciation occurring during marriage before death of H,
(Marsden) 60,000
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neither share for the unpaid balance of the debt.192 Utilizing this
modified approach in the present example, the total attributable
amount subject to possible in-law inheritance would be $77,208, while
the amount inheritable by WI's relatives would be $147,792.193
Clearly, the method of allocation used can make a significant dif-
ference in determining the amount attributable to a predeceased
Apportionment of appreciation after HI's death:
Credit for down payment $ 20,000
Reduction of principal during marriage of H, and W, 10.000
$ 30,000
Divided by purchase price $100,000
Equals percentage of appreciation attributable to
community property 30%
Multiplied by appreciation after death of H, ($ 120,000) 36.00
Total community property interest $126,000
One-half attributable to H, 
__3_0
Value Not Attributable to HI:
Return of principal payments by W, after the death of H, $ 15,000
Apportionment of appreciation after HI's death:
Credit for original loan proceeds $ 80,000
Less: Reduction of principal by W, & H, during marriage (10.000)
$ 70,000
Divided by purchase price $100,000
Equals percentage of appreciation attributable to
community property 70%
Multiplied by appreciation after death of H, ($ 120,000) 84000
Total separate property interest $ 99,000
Plus: Wl's One-half community property interest 63,000
Total value not attributable to H, 12.0
192. Wagner, supra note 178, at 39-41. This approach seems particularly appropri-
ate to in-law inheritance situations because the debt is allocated to those persons who
are living during the relative period.
193. The computations of the attributable and separate interests are as follows:
Summary of Costs and Values
Purchase price $100,000
Down payment 20,000
Original loan amount 80,000
Total reduction of principal as of W,'s death 25,000
Market value at HI's death (5 yrs. after purchase) 160,000
Appreciation as of Hl's death 60,000
Mkt value at W,'s death (12 yrs. after purchase) 280,000
Appreciation between deaths of H, & W, 120,000
Community Property Interest Attributable to H1:
Return of down payment $ 20,000
Return of appreciation occurring during marriage before death of H,
(Marsden) 60,000
Capital appreciation attributable to down payment (proportion of down
payment to purchase price multiplied by capital appreciation)
20,000 X 120,000 24,000
spouse. There would appear to be logical support for utilizing some
derivative of the traditional Moore/Marsden approach.
4. Changes in Value and Revenues Due to Contribution of
Capital by Surviving Spouse
After the death of the first spouse, the surviving spouse may make
capital outlays with respect to property which may be otherwise par-
tially or fully attributable to the predeceased spouse. When such out-
lays represent capital improvements or other enhancements to the
property, apportionment of the property at the death of the surviving
spouse may be appropriate to reflect such contributions.
In Nereson, the court appeared to endorse the use of the Pereira/
Van Camp approach to apportionment in such situations.1 94 The use
of a straight Pereira approach, evidently, would determine a fair re-
turn of the property without the improvements. That return would
be allocated to the attributable share, with the excess in actual value
Reduction of loan principal attributable to payments from community
property (proportion of number of yearly payments made from
community funds to total number of yearly payments made, up to
death of W1 , multiplied by amount principal was reduced up until
death of WI)
5 X 25,000 $ 10,417
Capital appreciation attributable to loan payments from community
property (proportion of loan to purchase price multiplied by proportion
of number of yearly payments made from community funds to total
number of yearly payments made, up to death of W1 , multiplied by
capital appreciation)
80,000 5
IWIM X x 120,000 40,000
154.417
One-half attributable to H, L7208
Value not attributable to HI:
Reduction of loan principal attributable to payments from separate
property (proportion of number of yearly payments made from
separate funds to total number of yearly payments made, up to death
of W1 , multiplied by amount principal was reduced up until death of
W)
7 X 25,000 $ 14,583
Capital appreciation attributable to loan payments from community
property (proportion of loan to purchase price multiplied by proportion
of number of yearly payments made from community funds to total
number of yearly payments made, up to death of W1, multiplied by
capital appreciation)
80,000 7
1U0700 x 12 x 120,000 56,000
Total separate property interest 70,583
Plus: W1's one-half community property interest 77.20
Total value not attributable to H, $17
See Wagner, supra note 178, at 39-41 for computational format.
194. Estate of Nereson v. Nereson, 194 Cal. App. 3d 865, 872, 875, 239 Cal. Rptr. 865,
869, 871 (1987).
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allocated to the non-attributable share.19 5 The actual capital expend-
itures made by tle surviving spouse are of no consequence in calcu-
lating the apportioned amounts under this method.1 9 6 The use of a
straight Van Camp approach appears particularly odd since its goal is
to determine a dollar value for services contributed by one spouse to
the apportionable property and allocate accordingly.197 Whereas, in
the current situation, the amount contributed to the apportionable
property has a known dollar amount-the contribution. This, in ef-
fect, would serve to reimburse the contributing spouse for the actual
capital outlay, but not apportion thereto any increase in value or in-
come from the property.19 Perhaps the utilization of this method,
which combines the two approaches, would be appropriate. 9 9 An-
other approach might be a modified Moore/Marsden method20 0 which
would treat capital contributions as a component of the original
purchase price for allocating post-contribution appreciation. 201
For purposes of illustration, assume that H 1 and W1, during their
marriage, purchased a home for $100,000 with community funds in-
curring (somewhat unrealistically) no debt. At Hl's death in 1980,
the house was in its original condition and was worth $160,000. W,
continued to live in the house; in 1982 She made capital improve-
ments consisting of the addition of two bedrooms, a new kitchen, and
a den. The cost of these improvements was $90,000, all of which
came from her separate, non-attributable, funds. When W, died in
1987, the house was worth $380,000, while similar homes in the area
had appreciated to an average of $230,000 during the same period.
195. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
196. No weight is given here since the determinative factor is the fair return on the
unimproved property. See infra note 202 and accompanying text for an example.
197. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
198. In the family law context, regarding division of property pursuant to divorce
or legal separation, California Civil Code section 4800.2 provides for straight reim-
bursement for separate property contributions to the community. CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 4800.2 (West Supp. 1989). Extension of this reimbursement methodology to the in-
law inheritance context would not, however, appear appropriate. Section 4800.2 is lim-
ited in its application only to division of property pursuant to divorce or legal separa-
tion and has been held not to apply in division of property in other family law
situations. In re Marriage of Gowdy, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1228, 224 Cal. Rptr. 400 (1986);
Shue & Velman, California Civil Code §§ 4800.1 and 4800.2: Review, Analysis, and
Suggestions for Reform, 12 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 5, 6 (1985).
199. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. See infra note 197 and accompany-
ing text for an example.
200. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. For an example of this method uti-
lized in the family law context, see In re Marriage of GCwdy, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1228, 224
Cal. Rptr. 400 (1986).
201. See infra note 206 and accompanying text for example utilizing this method.
Utilizing a straight Pereira approach, $230,000 would be allocated
to the community property share with one-half thereof, or $115,000,
representing the portion attributable to H, and subject to in-law in-
heritance.2 02 The balance of $265,000 would be inheritable by Wl's
relatives.203 A straight Van Camp approach would allocate $145,000
as property attributable to HI, with the balance of $235,000 being
property inheritable by Wl's relatives.20 4 A combination approach
would allocate values of $132,726 and $247,274 to the attributable and
non-attributable portions, respectively.20 5
Utilizing a modified Moore/Marsden approach, $275,790 would be
allocated to the community property share with one-half thereof, or
$137,894 representing the portion attributable to H, and subject to in-
law inheritance.206 The balance of $242,106 would be inheritable by
202. Utilization of the Pereira approach in the current example ignores the amount
of the actual separate capital contribution by W
, 
amounting to $90,000. The $230,000
value assigned to the community property share is derived solely from the value of
similarly-situated property without improvements.
203. The balance of $265,000 inheritable by Wl's relatives is computed by taking the
total value of the property at Wl's death ($380,000) less the portion computed as attrib-
utable to H1 ($115,000).
204. The values are computed as follows:
Value Attributable to H:
Total value of property $380,000
Less: value attributable to Wl's contributions (Van Camp) (.0000)
Total community property share $290,000
One-half attributable to HI $145.0
Value Not Attributable to H,:-
Total value of property $380,000
Less: amount attributable to H1  (15,0)
Value not attributable to HI _$23_00
205. The amounts are computed as follows:
Amount Attributable to HI:
Fair return via Pereira ($230,000 fair value less original cost
of $100,000) $130,000
Fair value of services via Van Camp 90.00
$220,000
Relative value of Pereira return ($130,000) to total ($220,000) 59.09%
Multiplied by total appreciation ($280,000) $165,452
Plus: original cost 100.00
Total community property share of property $265,452
One-half attributable to H1  $132,726
Amount Not Attributable to H,:
Total value of property $380,000
Less: amount attributable to H1 (as above) (132,726)
Amount not attributable to HI P4L2
206. The computations of the attributable and separate interests are as follows:
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Wi's relatives.20 7
Once again, the method utilized can make significant differences in
the amount determined attributable to a predeceased spouse.208 It
would appear that either the straight Pereira approach, the Pereira/
Van Camp combination approach, or the modified Moore/Marsden
method would carry the greatest degree of logical and equitable sup-
port in these situations.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the California in-law inheritance provisions
are complex, even in their most basic application. As emphasized in
this practicum, the practitioner confronts numerous issues in deter-
Summary of Costs and Values
Purchase price
Down payment
Original loan amount
Market value at HI's death
Appreciation as of HI's death
Capital contributions by W, after HI's death
Market value at W1's death
Appreciation between deaths of HI & W,
Community Property Interest Attributable to HI:
Return of down payment
Return of appreciation occurring during marriage before
death of H1 (Marsden)
Capital appreciation attributable to down payment
(proportion of down payment to sum of purchase price and
capital improvements multiplied by capital appreciation)1 f flftf
$100,000
100,000
0
160,000
60,000
90,000
380,000
220,000
$100,000
60,000
X 120,000 115.789
$275,789
One-half attributable to H1  $137.894
207. The balance of $242,106 inheritable by Wl's relatives is computed by ta1Eiiit e
total value of the property at Wl's death ($380,000) less the portion computed as attrib-
utable to H1 ($137,894). Another way to come to the same result is as follows:
.Value Not Attributable to HI:
Capital appreciation attributable to Wj's capital contribution
(proportion of capital contribution to sum of purchase price
and capital improvements multiplied by capital
appreciation)
90,0009,0 X 200,000 $104,211
Plus: W1 's One-half community property interest $137.895
Total value not attributable to H $242.106
208. The computed values for the share attributable to H, in the present example,
range in amounts from a low of $115,000 using the straight Pereira approach to a high
of $145,000 using a straight Van Camp approach, with the other two methods produc-
ing amounts in between these two extremes.
mining the extent to which the in-law inheritance provisions apply to
an intestate. Perhaps the most formidable issue is determining the
extent to which an intestate's property is attributable to a prede-
ceased spouse. The practitioner should be aware that, in making
such a determination, increases in the value of attributable property
which occur subsequent to the death of the first spouse may require
apportionment based on that which is attributable to such prede-
ceased spouse.
Although no particular method of property apportionment is pre-
scribed for each situation in which apportionment might arise, the
potential approaches draw heavily from those methods utilized for
apportionment of property in family law settings. This practicum has
attempted to explore those situations and identify the most appropri-
ate apportionment methods applicable thereto.
The nature of the in-law inheritance provisions and the consequent
apportionment problems are not, however, identical to apportion-
ment situations found in the family law environment. For this rea-
son, the practitioner need not feel that the apportionment methods
available in the in-law inheritance context are limited to strict inter-
pretations of those from family law. This practicum has suggested
those areas where a divergence from family law concepts appears ap-
propriate, and in those situations, has proposed alternative apportion-
ment methods.
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